"There is a widespread fear that religion is being treated as a problem to British society, best solved by airbrushing it from the public sphere."
-Stuart Jeffries, The Guardian

"We are witnessing a social phenomenon that is about fundamentalism. Atheists like the Richard Dawkins of this world are just as fundamentalist as the people setting off bombs on the tube, the hardline settlers on the West Bank and the anti-gay bigots of the Church of England. Most of them would regard each other as destined to fry in hell."
-Colin Slee, Dean of Southwark


"The study of other people's religious beliefs is now no longer merely desirable, but necessary for our very survival."
-Karen Armstrong

Wednesday, February 10, 2010

Nigel Biggar


Nigel Biggar is professor of Moral and Pastoral Theology at Oxford University and director of the McDonald Centre for Theology, Ethics and Public Life. There are a few important points from our conversation that I would like to highlight. First, we discussed the inevitability of differences of opinion on important matters within a democratic and pluralist society. Biggar says: “I don’t think that the answer is to require everyone to adopt the same set of terms and language and to suspend their deeper convictions and to bracket them or hide them away. I don’t think that’s feasible…The solution to managing conflict is to be found in the way in which we speak, not the language we speak it in…and the moral rules that we obey in dealing with other people with whom we disagree.” We discussed the controversy surrounding the established Church of England in a society of many faiths. According to Biggar, although the Church of England certainly enjoys a privileged position, the rest of society has complete religious freedom and the church has used its position quite generously to include other faiths in public affairs. In fact, many leaders of minority faith communities support the established church of England, stating that they would prefer to live in a nation “whose public institutions affirmed some kind of religion than one where none was affirmed.”

Biggar anticipated the counter-argument that although the established church does not restrict freedom of religion or impose any type of religious persecution on non-members, its very presence and influence in public ceremonies and institutions must result in making non-Anglicans feel as though they are second class citizens or not truly British. While irritation among non Anglicans is understandable, Biggar views such irritation as inevitable. He explains that “there is no such thing as an empty public space. There are always certain moral or metaphysical views that are either explicit or implicit. Public institutions do take moral, at least implicit moral and metaphysical stances.” If England chose to exclude religion from public institutions as is the case in France, religious believers would then be irritated. Biggar feels that public institutions cannot avoid taking some kind of stand on the issue and regardless of what that is, someone will end up frustrated. He continued: “And the people who are irritated have every freedom to argue in public that institutions should take a different stand. That’s part of democratic politics. But putting up with irritation in public life is what the liberal virtue of tolerance is all about. Tolerance is not putting up with what you don’t care about…I think in a degenerate form, tolerance means that basically you can do whatever you please as long as you don’t bother me. I don’t care what you do just as long as I can get to do what I do. Whereas I think a stronger form of tolerance is where you do something that irritates me and I tolerate it.”

A little side note: The extent of English tolerance is being put to the test as British society becomes increasingly diverse. The presence of multiple faiths, ethnicities, and backgrounds is quickly distinguishing between the stereotypical English “indifference” to others as long as they remain at a distance and true, liberal tolerance of very real difference. Characteristic British indifference may not be enough in a multicultural community. Instead, I think pluralist societies are in desperate need of active interfaith and intercultural dialogue, significant steps towards mutual understanding, and the willingness to tolerate substantial differences on a variety of levels. At the same time, I think it is crucial for members of society to not shy away from open and honest discussion about the positive and negative aspects of its various cultures so as to realistically deal with important issues that may be uncomfortable but are vital to the community's cohesion and survival.

Next we discussed whether the established Church and Christian morality are central to the idea of “Britishness” and British identity. Long established British institutions embody particular values that historically have been conveyed through the Christian faith. However, there is a current debate over whether such Christian influence should continue in a multi-faith society and whether society can keep the values and drop the religion. While this may be possible to an extent, Biggar sees it as a very complex and controversial undertaking and mentioned some atheist philosophers who actually doubt it can be done. One philosopher at the University of London has said that he thinks that “the affirmation of human dignity outside of a theological context is the equivalent of whistling in the dark…that the notion has no home outside of that context.” Additionally and very significantly, Jürgen Habermas, a German intellectual who previously subscribed to the secularization thesis, more recently “made the interesting statement that he thinks that religious traditions have the capacity to articulate our moral intuitions…by which I think he means his liberal humanist moral intuitions…so here’s a non religious person recognizing that religion, and in his case Christianity, can articulate important values that he holds, and he’s not confident that if you can extract these values from a religious context, that they will make much sense.” Overall, Biggar believes that the British people will lose more than they realize if they choose to divorce their values from the Christian tradition.

On a slightly different note, the debate over the essence of “Britishness” is especially important in light of the massive population mobility and immigration into the UK of people from all over the world. The ideology of multiculturalism has admirably aspired to allow and appreciate diversity by encouraging newcomers to maintain their cultural heritage within their new home. However, this policy has led to a kind of cultural relativism in which all cultures are to be considered as equals and can ultimately stifle intelligent conversation about which values, traditions, and customs are truly harmful or beneficial to society. According to Biggar, the idea that all cultures are equal is “just not true. And anyone who is liberal knows it’s not true.” In his opinion, the silver lining to the 7/7 tragedy is that it awoke many people to the reality of extremist fundamentalism and “the fact that there are certain cultures that we cannot tolerate.” While British society may be plural, “that does not mean that anything goes.” When immigrants choose to make Britain their home, they must realize that they are becoming part of a country with a “certain definite character and if they want to become citizens, in a sense, they have to commit themselves to be British...this is not just an empty space for them to inhabit…this was never an empty space. We just forgot that it wasn’t. So I think more thought about what modern Britishness consists of is important and immigrants need to be aware of it—whatever we decide it happens to be…”

Thursday, February 4, 2010

This may not be a very big deal at all, but for me, it was a good example/reminder of how religious differences really do impact daily life in a pluralist city like London in a way that we aren't as aware of in Austin. The other night I met up with my friend Shila from UCL to go to dinner with some friends from her MA course at Imperial. We finally decided that we all wanted Nando's (a sort of nicer fast food restaurant), but the Nando's closest to uni is not Halal and Hazim (one of Shila's Muslim friends from Brunei) was not in the mood for vegetarian. Everyone tried to convince him to just not get the chicken but he wouldn't budge so after a lot of arguing, we ended up going to Pizza Hut instead. I got the impression that they have this argument on a regular basis which I found funny and also really weird! It was also cool to see some of what I'm studying played out in the everyday life of my friends..

Abdelwahab El Affendi


Abdelwahab El Affendi Osman is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster and coordinator of the Centre's Democracy and Islam Programme. The majority of our conversation centered on the topic of identity. According to Mr. Affendi, many conflicts between religious groups are not actually a direct result of religious differences as we often assume. Instead, he says there is often a different cause and religion is merely adopted as part of the group identity (rather than the root cause). As an example, he cited the conflict between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. While many people might categorize this conflict as a religious one, Affendi says that, in fact, for many in Northern Ireland, their Catholic or Protestant identities are generally inherited rather than chosen: “it becomes just like ethnicity—just like black and white in America. I was born black. I was born Catholic. That’s how I am.” He claims that many “Irish Catholics” are actually Marxists who have little religious belief at all. Thus, religion in this case is not a cause of conflict but merely an identity adopted by conflicting groups.

Similarly, Mr. Affendi suggests that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not based on religious difference but rather “a struggle over land, an ethnic struggle…There are atheist Jews and there are also Marxist-atheist Arabs that don’t believe in Islam but fight on the Palestinian side—not as much as a result of religion but because of identity, ethnicity. So in this regard, you can’t say that it is religion that is dividing people in this sense.” Affendi claims that the Palestinians initially wouldn’t have cited Islam as their creed, that most of them were actually Marxists and some of the earlier leaders were Christians. As a whole, the Palestinians saw themselves as Arab rather than Muslim and would have been more sympathetic with the communist Soviet Union over some other Arab countries. More recently, as Hamas has gained power and become more effective in fighting Israel, Palestinians have identified themselves as Muslims: “not because of its ideology but in spite of it…they say well okay, in the past we followed these Marxists but it wasn’t good now let’s see what these Islamists can do for us.”

…I think the idea that warring groups may adopt a religious identity that contributes to (though is not the cause of) their mutual antagonism is an interesting one and could be accurate to an extent in many situations throughout history. As far as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I think Mr. Affendi is right in categorizing it as a struggle over land. However, my understanding of the situation is that this particular land has a deeply religious significance for both groups and thus the conflict is inextricably linked to religion—which in this case, seems to be extremely divisive.

Next we turned to the topic of the identity crisis faced by many immigrants today. Most immigrants to Europe and the States are presented with the difficult and confusing challenge of juggling multiple identities. This often comes in the form of both an internal struggle with oneself over questions of loyalty and belonging as well as an external struggle and negotiation with society. There is a tendency in host countries to over generalize and to ignore, intentionally or not, important differences in background, country of origin, and cultural heritage. There is often a clash or disconnect between the way an immigrant defines himself and the way his new society defines him. Mr. Affendi pointed out that prior to arriving in England, many immigrants have a more nuanced conception of themselves which may be completely ignored by society in favor of a broader generalization. For example, someone might be Pakistani or Indian, or a specific ethnicity within India, but once in Europe, they all fall under the broad and undifferentiated category of “Muslim.” In the same way, someone from Africa might be a Nigerian, and within Nigeria, he may be Yoruba or Hausa. “But then he comes to Britain or America, and everyone says, ‘No, you are black and that’s your identity.’” In the face of discrimination, immigrants that previously had no ties to each other may ultimately come together under the umbrella of the identity imposed upon them by the dominant society. Affendi says that British immigrants from Pakistan or India would not necessarily feel that they have anything in common. However, discrimination and generalization by the host society begins to create a British-Muslim identity that serves to bind them together.

The societal formation of and individual adjustment to this new identity can serve to strengthen the immigrant’s ties to Islam. Mr. Affendi explained that many Muslim immigrants who previously drank alcohol or neglected prayers have actually become more pious after arriving in Europe. Many are embracing their Islamic identity and are now wearing the hijab and participating in other Muslim rituals whereas before “they wouldn’t have really thought about it.” For some, Islam has become a positive way to establish an identity and find a sense of belonging in a pluralist society. However, others embrace radical forms of Islam as a reaction against discrimination and feelings of alienation by mainstream society. This is especially the case among second and third generation young British Muslims. Affendi explains that “if you went to a Yorkshire school in Leeds and spoke with a Yorkshire accent, you’d think that you were a Yorkshire person just like your white classmates. But then if somebody tries to show you that no, you are not, you are inferior, you are an immigrant…then if somebody else comes to you saying, well, you are a Muslim and Islam is the greatest religion in the world and we are better than these people who are unbelieving and ignorant,” you might find that to be very appealing. In that sense, young British Muslims that feel neither fully British nor Pakistani or Indian or whatever are especially susceptible to recruitment by radical Islamic fundamentalists that provide them with a higher calling and a feeling of belonging in a worldwide battleground in which they can play an important role.

Monday, February 1, 2010

Stephen Law


I've been reading too much and have started getting behind on transcribing my interviews! Last week I met with Stephen Law, senior lecturer in Philosophy at Heythrop College, editor of THINK, a journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy aimed at the general public, and author of The War for Children's Minds, a defense of liberal values against moral and religious authoritarianism. One common theme that I've noticed in my conversations with secularists is their desire for equality or "parity" among religious and non-religious groups. In Law's view, a secular state should be completely neutral in regard to religion. A fully neutral state not only prevents conflict between groups but also protects, equally, the freedom of its citizens to engage in whatever religious activities they choose. According to Law, if the state aligns itself with a specific faith, others in the community will inevitably feel left out and aggrieved. Law explains that this "brand of secularism" is "not religiously or non-religiously partisan...it's kind of neutral on the religious issue. But of course for many religious people, to call something secular is essentially to call it atheist, and so that confuses things, and that’s not how I’m using the term." Along with many others, Law feels that Christianity is given an unfair privilege in society in the form of the established Church of England, the 26 seats reserved for Bishops in the House of Lords, etc. Ideally, each religious or non religious group would enjoy equal representation in a secular society.

Such a society, according to Law, should be founded upon "principles hopefully to which we can all sign up whether we are or are not religious--the kind of principles to which many religious people are drawn, but the kind of principles to which many non-religious people are drawn to as well. The kind of principles to which we all, as human beings, can sign up...And while religious people might want to offer religious justifications for them, the state itself doesn’t get into that kind of business." At first glance, this seems like a brilliant idea--and even quite simple. Certainly there are specific values and moral standards that we all agree on, that are, in a sense, "given." But wait, what values are those??? The liberal West champions human rights--freedom of speech, freedom of religious belief, equality before the law.. In the words of the French Revolution: "liberty, equality, fraternity." For Westerners, these moral standards seem obvious--like second nature. However, the Western value system doesn't necessarily represent the norm throughout the rest of the world, as we are being forced to realize in many ways. As a result of increasing globalization and unprecedented population mobility, strikingly different value systems and worldviews are suddenly intersecting--coming into contact with one another on the streets of London and many other cities. This growing plurality makes the search for common, shared values both increasingly important and increasingly formidable. As I continue to read about and discuss the issues that face a pluralist society, I am becoming convinced that some kind of agreement on a common value system is crucial in building a cohesive society out of a multiplicity of backgrounds, beliefs, and identities, but that determining the nature of such a value system will prove to be extremely difficult.

Law’s own opinions illustrate the complexity and difficulty in determining a shared value system in two ways. First, within a pluralist society, there are often dramatic and irreconcilable differences in people’s fundamental views on right and wrong and human rights. He mentioned a poll taken in Britain a few years ago which revealed that 33% of young British Muslims believed death to be an appropriate penalty for deserters of the faith. Law pointed to the disconcerting fact that most of those surveyed had recently left English state schools, not some kind of radical fundamentalist Islamic school. According to Law, “It’s just not acceptable that they have that kind of attitude. And schools should be knocking it out very early on. Every single child in every school, even Islamic schools in this country should be constantly reminded that what religious beliefs they hold are up to them and them alone. It is their free choice, and no one gets killed or threatened or anything else because they’ve held a belief or their Imam or their mom and dad tell them. It’s up to them—their choice.” For Law, it is completely and obviously unacceptable that someone should be punished by death for their religious beliefs. Faith is a personal choice made freely by the individual. Surely the vast majority of British society wholeheartedly agrees with him. However, it seems clear that some do not. So in a situation like this, can an agreement on a communal moral standard be reached? It seems that at some point, someone is going to have to make a value judgment about which value system is superior.

Law’s next comment reveals that even within a society that has agreed to a large extent on big issues such as human rights, the search for a “neutral” system of shared values is more problematic than it seems. He mentioned the bullying of homosexuals as something that schools should take responsibility for and work to prevent. According to Law, this type of bullying happens much more often in religious schools. At least in Western societies, I think everyone can agree that any kind of bullying is not something that should be tolerated or considered socially acceptable. However, Law takes it a step further: “Those schools [religious schools] need to be doing something about that. They need to be forced to tell children that there is nothing wrong with being a homosexual. And, unfortunately, there are a lot of schools in this country that are not happy about conveying that message to children. So again I just think they should be compelled to.” To clarify, I asked, “So more than just preventing bullying, you think that they need to tell the kids that it’s okay to be a homosexual? Regardless of what their parents or religion are saying?” Law: “Yes. I do. …Makes me sound kind of illiberal. Yeah, I think there are certain basic moral standards, that being one of them, that we should make sure the schools are communicating.” Again, the search for common values proves to be elusive. While a secularist and a Catholic will probably both oppose bullying in schools, each will have very different views about the morality of homosexuality. And yet, at least for Law, teaching children that the homosexual lifestyle is normal and appropriate is part of a “basic moral standard.” So what is our basic moral standard? Do we even have one?

Sunday, January 24, 2010

Terry Sanderson


Last week, I met with the president of the National Secular Society, Terry Sanderson. (See link on the right). Mr. Sanderson’s perception of the state of religious belief in Britain and in Europe as a whole is that it is experiencing significant decline. The original secularization thesis predicted that modernization would result in religion becoming obsolete. The United States has clearly proved an exception to that rule, causing controversy and confusion among scholars and sociologists. Sanderson’s primary explanation of the strikingly different levels of secularization between modern Europe and modern America (along with the developing world) is the feeling of security Europeans derive from their social health care system. He says that the reason secularization is happening in Europe so dramatically is “because we have a hugely successful social and health service that protects you from cradle to grave—you will never find yourself in the gutter dying in this country.” He argues that Americans feel less secure than Europeans because they lack this “social safety net” and thus, find themselves in “a very powerless state if their health declines.” Poverty and lack of security, Sanderson posits, results in a higher need for religion. “You can see it in Haiti where religion is being reinforced by this earthquake because that’s all they have—they have nothing else to turn to.” Mr. Sanderson predicts that America’s need for religion will lessen “when Mr. Obama gets his healthcare bill through…the more social care there is provided by the state, the weaker religion will become.”
Note: If interested in this explanation of the disparity between the religiosity of the States and the secularism of Europe, see Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart’s Sacred and Secular, in which they present a “revised theory of secularization based on existential security” that seeks to account for the religious variation evident throughout the world.

Sanderson recognizes that religious belief can be a positive force in society, especially in building community bonds and providing relationships. However, he believes that religion can also bring irrationality into societal policy making. He referred to a debate in Parliament last year over a proposal to legalize assisted suicide by allowing relatives to bring their loved ones to a clinic in Switzerland that provides euthanasia without being prosecuted for aiding and abetting suicide. According to Mr. Sanderson, when the debate came forward in Parliament, 80% of the population supported the proposal. However, “a small group of Christians in Parliament blocked it and said, ‘No, our religion says you can’t do this, so nobody’s going to be able to do it. You can’t make a decision on your own, we’re making it for you’—and that’s where I think religion brings irrationality and authoritarianism. It takes peoples decisions away from them. If you want an abortion, that should be your decision. It shouldn’t be the church who says it’s against our teachings, so nobody’s going to have an abortion or whatever. All these social issues that the church is obsessed about controlling… In some respects, I think their attitudes about these issues have driven people away.”

When it comes to the question of religion’s place in the political sphere, Mr. Sanderson’s primary frustrations are the overrepresentation of religious interests in the government and lobbying by religious groups for privileges and exemptions. Sanderson supports the right of religious groups to “lobby in the same way that any other group can lobby—but they don’t lobby in that way. They have special privileged access to the political process because of their place in the establishment.” In addition to the Archbishop of Canterbury’s direct access to the Prime Minister, twenty-six seats in the House of Lords are reserved for bishops who contribute to making legislation. “So that’s not ordinary lobbying.” In order to level the playing field, Mr. Sanderson argues that the bishops should be removed from the House of Lords and that each religious group should be required to operate on an equal footing with all other groups lobbying for change. In addition to the twenty-six bishops, the Chief Rabbi, and potentially a prominent Muslim representative, has been given peerage in the House of Lords in order to create a sort of multi-faith representation in Parliament, which Mr. Sanderson views as “unhealthy.” On top of that, thirteen faith advisors were recently appointed to increase understanding and engagement between faith groups and the government. In the future, Mr. Sanderson hopes that members of the House of Lords will be elected rather than appointed—“and if that happens, these religious representatives will have to get in on their merit rather than that they are religious representatives.”

Mr. Sanderson also disapproves of a perceived push by faith groups for privilege and exemption based on their religious beliefs. He mentioned several examples of recent attempts to obtain religious privilege in the workplace. A Jewish woman applied for the position of food taster at Marks & Spencer (a grocery store) but refused to taste anything with pork in it, and M&S was subsequently prosecuted for refusing her the job. Similarly, he gave the example of Muslim workers at Tesco supermarkets refusing to sell alcohol and pork products. In a variety of ways, religious activists are “becoming very pushy and are trying to obtain privileges that nobody else can have. You know, the rules are for everybody else, but not if you’re Christian or Muslim…” Mr. Sanderson pointed to the current debate over the equality bill which aims to eliminate discrimination against groups based on gender, age, disability, religion, and sexual orientation. According to Sanderson, “religious elements are trying desperately to get themselves exempted from this, particularly in relation to homosexuality. They’re saying, we don’t want this to apply to us. We need to be exempted from it—otherwise, we might have to employ homosexuals and allow them to become priests.” The government initially allowed them to “continue discriminating;” however, the National Secular Society actually sent a complaint to the European Commission which had previously issued an anti-discrimination directive to all of Europe providing the minimum standards for anti-discrimination. The NSS complained that the British government, in allowing “opt outs” to various religious groups, was not abiding by the directive which only allows exemptions to those directly engaged in promoting religion. In response, Sanderson said that the European Commission wrote to the British government, directing them to narrow the exemptions, which they are doing with the new equality bill, and “the religious establishment is fighting like crazy and is really kicking up a stink about it.”

Finally, we discussed Mr. Sanderson’s view of the definition and purpose of secularism. In his words, “secularism is about accommodating everybody, ensuring everybody’s safe and that no religion has supreme power as it does in, say, Saudi Arabia or Iran or Iraq where minority religions are absolutely persecuted to hell. If you want to stop that happening, secularism can help. It can actually help minority religions to have a voice and not be trampled underfoot by majority religions. And I think that’s a much healthier way of doing things…So I think the framers of the American Constitution had it absolutely right. They were so prescient—they foresaw what was coming, and they made contingency arrangements. They said, ‘You know, if we don’t establish any particular religion, then we won’t have the religious wars that they’ve had in Europe.’ And you haven’t.” Sanderson believes that “secularism can stop religious warfare in its tracks. We’ve got a slogan that says ‘Secularism Protects,’ and I think it does. There’s nothing fundamentalist about that. I understand that religious people do think that Christianity should dictate our lives, and there are people who think that religion is so important to them that it’s necessary for us to imbue everything. I think they are the fundamentalists. People who want secularism say, ‘Look, you’ve got your place, we’ve got our place, everybody’s got a place. You can’t force us to believe what you believe just because you think it’s the right thing.’ And secularism protects people from that. I think it really important. There’s nothing fundamentalist about it. If secularists are fundamentalists, the whole of the United States, the whole of France, the whole of Turkey, the whole of Japan—they’re all fundamentalists because they’re all secularists. They have to be if they live in a secular country with a secular constitution. So I don’t think it’s dangerous. I don’t think it’s fundamentalist. I think it’s absolutely essential.”

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

Jonathan Rée


Yesterday I met with Jonathan Rée, who is a member of the British Humanist Association, a writer, philosopher, and historian, and a founder of Radical Philosophy in the 1970s. Mr. Rée describes himself as an atheist in the sense that he does not believe in God but not in the sense that he despises religion in any form. In his opinion, many militant atheists are too quick to assume that they have a full understanding of what religious people are talking about, whereas religious belief often turns out to be more complex than they imagine. Additionally, he pointed out that quite a few religious people are entirely unconcerned with the existence of God and are more focused on living life with a kind of reverence. In that sense, Mr. Rée admits that he is actually inclined to feel warmly towards religion and quite likes the idea of a sort of atheistic religion. Among other 19th century thinkers, John Stuart Mill implied that religion is so much a part of human heritage that the idea of totally rejecting is is unthinkable--if you are a non religious person, you should be asking yourself what we can make of religion in the future that will be beneficial to society and not necessarily subject to intellectual criticism.

Rée describes himself as a rather wishy-washy atheist compared to his more aggressive counterparts. When asked about the approach of other members of the 'new atheism' such as Richard Dawkins, he replied that he "can't stand Dawkins' way of going about it because I think that he has no philosophical or intellectual curiosity and I think that he assumes that he knows what theists believe and it's obviously stupid." Rée feels that many militant atheists fail to grasp the complexity of religious beliefs and in attempting to oversimplify religious faith, they insult the people they are trying to argue with which is impolite and also unproductive."

In contrast to Dawkins and Hitchens, Rée recognizes the great good that many religious groups bring and have historically brought to society. Rather than religion poisoning everything as Hitchens suggests, Rée concedes that "almost every progressive movement that has happened in history has directly or indirectly had some kind of religious motivation, and actually, though I am quite seriously anti-Christian in a lot of ways, a lot of the things that make the society better are due to the campaigns of people acting explicitly in the name of Christianity. Or if looking a bit deeper, they are drawing on Christian traditions even if they don't count themselves as Christians." For Rée, his personal non religious beliefs are based on theoretical reasons and not because of an opinion on whether religion is "good" or "bad" for society. In fact, in his view, if the argument against religion is to be based on purely utilitarian considerations about whether it's done any good to the world or not, "then I'm not entirely sure that my soft atheist position would come out better than the Christians."

When it comes to religion inserting itself into the public sphere, many of Rée's opinions are based on practicality rather than principle. When asked to share his thoughts on the 2004 debate surrounding the inclusion of Christianity in the preamble to the constitution of the European Union (a document meant to essentially define united Europe), he responded that a mention of Christianity would be rather extraordinary but that he found it much less upsetting than other members of the British Humanist Association because he couldn't see it having any real legal meaning. If the underlying agenda was to exclude non-Christian countries such as Turkey from acceptance into the EU by defining it as Christian, then he would have been strongly opposed. But a mere mention of Europe's Christian heritage in the preamble did not strike him as highly problematic. Similarly, in reference to the possible French ban of the hijab, he replied that he "can't connect the issue with any principles." Personally, he prefers to see people's faces rather than have them hidden behind a veil or huge sunglasses (so he would not like the sorority girls at SMU.) To him, a veil seems very impersonal and sends the message that an individual is unwilling or reluctant to be open and engage with society. However, as much as he would prefer that people simply didn't want to wear them in the first place, Rée questions the effectiveness and possible repercussions of such a ban in society. Restricting specific clothes would inevitably be highly offensive to many people and might ultimately provoke them to cling even more firmly to their rituals and habits. Thus, the issue becomes one of political judgment rather than principle--of progress and cohesion rather than right and wrong.

In general, Rée is an avid supporter of diversity. He views the United States' experiment of "mixing up people of different backgrounds [as] actually rather wonderful and makes life more interesting and makes people more intelligent in the long run and opens up people's intellectual horizons." While he finds some religious beliefs, such as Islam and Christian literalism, especially incomprehensible, he does not view those beliefs as grounds for exclusion. In fact, Rée views the public expression of Islam in England as helpful in educating others about their faith. In response to the recent appointment of 13 faith advisers in the UK, he says "why not try?" The more knowledge the government has about various religions, the less likely they are to offend someone or cause disruption in pluralistic communities. He also mentioned that he is quite fond of the idea of voluntary organizations that seek to contribute to society, many of which are religious. He believes that there ought to be ways to involve such groups in giving advice to government--"not saying their advice is going to be sacrosanct but just to hear from as many groups as possible." Politicians are obligated to listen to the voices of all groups, both religious and non religious.

Finally, Rée supports what he calls a "high minded idea of the political sphere." In this regard, he suspects that he may be a bit of a secular fundamentalist because in his view, it makes sense to require that when people are acting and speaking politically, they should forget about their religious beliefs. Initially, I thought that he was saying that there should be absolutely no mention of religious values or beliefs in any kind of official political arena. However, rather than opposition to an honest discussion or explanation of the way in which one's religious values shape one's views on policy making, Rée is fiercely opposed to the possibility of one person turning to another and saying, "I don't care what you say because you aren't a good Muslim...Politics is a special kind of protected area where people talk about how they want to live together and it does seem that there is a good case for saying it is absolutely forbidden for people in that sphere to say, 'you're not allowed to play this game because you're not a good Christian, etc...'"

I responded with the question: "What about people that have a religious belief that impacts their view on something in the public sphere? Is it appropriate for them to come to the table and say that I feel this way about this topic because of these beliefs? Is it beneficial for them to explain that?" His last response was my favorite part of the interview. He answered "yes" but that people should be able to explain their underlying beliefs and values and then realize that other people might simply not find them convincing. Ree: "And I actually think that in the long run, it’s going to be educational for them--that they’re actually going to discover that whatever makes them so sure of their opinions on these moral issues maybe isn’t as firmly grounded as they’d like to think, and there may be something genuinely discussable. ...Not that anyone's going to say that you have to change your opinions before you take part in the debate, but my guess is that once they’ve thought about it more they might change their mind. And I suppose that this is another thing about the nature of politics: that you have to go into politics thinking that it’s possible that the other people are right. And that’s one of the respects in which I think political thinking is superior to fundamentalist theological thinking." Okay, fair enough. I actually totally agree. He ended with the statement: "You know that you can believe something very warmly and passionately but you should also have a bit of your mind saying look, maybe it's wrong. And that’s one of the reasons, I suppose, to go back to the first question, that there may be some plausibility in the statement that religious belief is damaging if it leads some people to think that what they think is the only thing that could conceivably be justified."

Final Thought: After reading books and articles by atheists such as Dawkins, Hitchens, and Harris, I found my conversation with Jonathan to be surprisingly refreshing. Often throughout the interview, he would burst into laughter immediately following a serious or straightforward statement about his own opinions on an issue. To me, Rée gave the impression of a man with considerable intellectual capacity and achievement who has managed to not take himself too seriously and who is able have an amicable conversation about very pressing and controversial issues. In my experience, that is a very rare and valuable quality that deserves a lot of respect.

Tuesday, January 19, 2010

Article from the National Secular Society Website: Gordon Brown insists that religion is at the centre of his government.

http://www.secularism.org.uk/gordon-brown-insists-that-religi.html